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Abstract 
Ideally, land use policies correct for negative externalities. However, the barriers they 
impose on individuals and communities have serious implications. Existing studies on 
this topic focus on singular, specific areas because land regulation is determined at the 
local level and varies extensively across the nation. Furthermore, current housing 
literature focuses on the “norm” of single family housing. This ignores the changing 
attitudes toward different types of dwellings. My study examines local regulatory 
environments across the nation by using Gyourko et al. 2008’s Wharton Residential Land 
Use Regulation Index, which develops a comparative scale for the otherwise impossibly 
varied regulatory environments. I also use micro data from the American Community 
Survey to see individual housing choices. Then, with a custom-made dataset from these 
two sources, I use empirical regression analysis to study the effects of land use regulation 
on people’s housing decisions, specifically the choice between a single-family house and 
a multi-family apartment complex. My results show that more restrictive regulation 
makes a person more likely to rent their home as well as occupy a multi-family apartment 
complex as opposed to a single-family home.   
6 
 
I. Introduction 
Few government policies influence individuals’ daily lives as directly as land use 
policies. Land is a finite resource, yet an ever-increasing number of individuals consume 
it, most obviously through housing. Thus, it is important to understand how local 
governments’ regulation of land affects the supply of and demand for different housing 
options. How do real estate zoning policies affect residential home pricing and 
consequently people’s willingness to rent (rather than buy) and/or live in a multi-family 
housing complex (rather than a single-family home)? I find that land use restrictions do in 
fact influence individuals’ housing decisions. Land use policies ideally correct for 
negative externalities, but the barriers they impose on housing development have their 
own side effects. While zoning has its benefits – it is certainly nicer not to live next to a 
factory – it seems, at least inadvertently, to force people away from desired locations by 
restricting the supply of optimal housing choices. Without the ability to live in their 
preferred housing type, people may choose to live elsewhere which has costs of its own. 
People accuse zoning policies of exacerbating the housing affordability crisis, pushing 
working families out of flourishing job market areas, and limiting otherwise natural 
economic and community growth (United States of America. Council of Economic 
Advisors 2016). The goal of this study is to further identify a pattern between land use 
policy and individual housing decisions in order to optimize available housing, which 
hopefully in turn benefits the economy and individuals alike. 
Land use regulation and microeconomic housing trends are individually studied 
extensively, but joint examination is minimal. Existing literature is limited in two ways -- 
first by narrowly focusing on single metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) due to a lack of 
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policy consistency and secondly by narrowly defining dwelling type. The study of 
housing and public policy in the context of urban economics is difficult because housing 
is such a unique commodity. It varies spatially, structurally, and fiscally. No other studies 
have been done that specifically connect land use regulations and individual housing 
choices in MSAs nationwide. Is there, in fact, hidden meaning to the multitude of 
apparently incongruous multi-family structures that seem to plague cities? Alternatively, 
can the current economic and political trends sustain the “norm” of single-family 
housing?  
However, the housing “norm” seems to be changing. The 2008 crisis and the burst 
of the housing bubble resulted in not only a change in the economic climate, but also a 
change of attitude in people’s housing decisions. The single-family housing “norm” is 
shifting to more multi-family rental properties (Fernald et al. 2015). Land use policies 
issued by local governments define housing options by designating areas appropriate for 
residential use. This inherently imposes certain patterns of development of certain types 
of dwellings. Do these housing patterns properly account for the broadening definition of 
a residence? The current state of housing economics is in need of both more recent 
examination, as well as fresh approaches to the topic that reflect these new attitudes 
toward the multitude of housing choices (Fernald et al. 2015).  
In my study, I examine national micro data from the American Community 
Survey (ACS) in conjunction with data from the Wharton Residential Land Use 
Regulatory Index to investigate the patterns of living choices across the United States at 
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the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level between 2005 and 2011.1 I explore how 
various factors such as rent values, dwelling values, individual demographic traits, 
economic variables and structural classifications impact people’s housing choices. Unlike 
previous studies, I examine the national picture in a time period that encapsulates the 
2008 housing crisis. Specifically using regression analysis, I test whether places with 
more restrictive land use policies have more people choosing to live in multi-family 
housing due to higher housing prices.  
I find that stricter land use policies are associated with a greater likelihood of 
living in a multi-family apartment as opposed to a single-family house. Additionally, 
stricter land use policies increase the probability of being a renter of either a single-
family or a multi-family dwelling. Finally, linear regressions show that where there are 
more stringent land use policies, rents are higher. However, land use policies have a 
substantially larger effect on owned, single-family dwelling values relative to apartment 
rental values. While some might simply opt to move to a different city if they find the 
housing conditions disagreeable, many do not have this flexibility. Therefore, zoning 
clearly not only influences holistic community development, but it also affects the 
housing options of location-constrained individuals.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes necessary background 
information and discusses relevant literature. Section III describes the data. Section IV 
                                                          
1 The Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) is the most widely used urban data unit of 
geography (Fischel 1985). Furthermore, “researchers are more interested in residential 
land regulation in metropolitan areas because they contain the vast majority (about 
4/5ths) of the country’s population” (Gyourko et al. 2008 pp. 9). Consequently, the data I 
use in my study is also at the MSA level. 
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discusses the empirical strategy and results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 
V. 
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II. Background 
As early as 1885, and arguably even earlier, local governments in the United 
States have regulated land use (Meck 2006). The Standard Acts of 1921 formally gave 
local governments delegatory power over how land was used for a community and its 
growth (Meck 2006). Since then, codification, or more commonly called zoning, has 
evolved inconsistently according to each locality. Some such zones include residential, 
agricultural, commercial, and industrial. The goal of assigning a categorical label to 
particular areas is to allow existing uses of the space to persist, preserve the integrity of 
its usage, and prevent inappropriate forms of development (Goldsmith 2016). Zoning 
quite literally shapes the form of a community by determining the citizens’ housing 
options. In theory, housing supply acts independently (and is thus “fixed”); zoning 
increases housing demand, thus pushing a housing demand curve up and to the right 
along the supply curve. People would simply move where they can afford their preferred 
housing choice. This results in higher rents and greater quantities of housing in the most 
desirable places.  
While this seems positive, zoning has produced questionable consequences. Many 
believe zoning practices to be an infringement on basic property rights -- the government 
should not decide how an owner uses their property. Furthermore, people condemn 
zoning practices for inflating house values and for discriminating against minorities 
(Seitles 1998). However, the 1926 case Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. produced a 
landmark decision regarding the constitutionality and intentions of zoning practices. The 
Court upheld that zoning controlled community nuisances and was thus reasonably under 
government jurisdiction (Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co 1926). In particular, the 
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deciding justice, Justice Sutherland, claimed that apartments and other multi-family units 
threatened residential character by parasitically taking advantage of certain land (Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co 1926). “Residential character” implies the exclusion of 
certain types of buildings that attract certain demographics. Efforts to preserve 
“residential character” fail to accommodate demand changes. Rather, they assume 
housing demand is fixed; zoning thus limits the housing supply, and shifts a housing 
supply curve upward along the demand curve. This causes higher rents and fewer 
housing options. Given how dramatically the economy, cities, and social norms have 
changed since the 1926 decision, it is worth re-examining the purpose and effectiveness 
of zoning. Since communities continue to create and practice zoning laws today, many 
studies have been done to assess how they actually affect a community’s health, safety, 
and wellbeing.  
It is important to note that zoning practices are not federally delegated and 
consequently that there are nuances within each locality. A handful of analytical studies 
attempt to aggregate the various manners in which local governments classify land. Rolf 
Pendall, Robert Puentes, and Jonathan Martin (2006) review the land use regulations in 
the United States’ fifty largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). Their study explains 
basic government regulation practices, the effectiveness of such, and the correlated 
impact on the area's demographics, including housing affordability. Their results range 
from “exclusionary and restrictive” to “innovative and accommodating” areas. 
Specifically, exclusionary MSAs show high housing prices, fewer housing opportunities 
for low income residents, and possibly even fewer personal advancement opportunities 
by indirectly forcing the relocation of those fiscally unable to live in such an area. This 
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kind of housing exclusion results in urban sprawl and segregation. While more 
accommodating areas experience similar results, lower average housing prices are 
reported (Pendall et al. 2006, Seitles 1998).  
In the same vein of Pendall et al. (2006), Joseph Gyourko, Albert Saiz, and Anita 
Summers (2008) more succinctly measure local regulatory environments into a single 
value called, the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index (henceforth referred to 
as WRLURI) (2008), where lower values correspond with less restrictive policies.2 
According to their results, highly regulated land use correlates with higher income, higher 
dwelling values, and high regulation in other aspects of life. Interestingly, land scarcity 
does not cause higher regulation as is commonly thought (Gyourko et al. 2008). Because 
land use policies are unique to every local government and because these aggregated 
national studies on regulatory environments are so recent, most of the housing market 
research has yet to compare the relationship between policies and individual housing 
choices in different communities across the country.  
Instead, policy and housing studies tend to focus on a single, specific MSAs’ 
policies (see for example, Yan Song et al. (2004), Matthew Resseger (2013), and Henry 
Pollakowski et al. (1990)). By narrowing the geographic area of interest, results are 
presumably more reliable because it eliminates the variation in local land use policy. If 
studies do examine multiple MSAs, then they tend to examine very general 
macroeconomic housing trends that do not focus on land use policy at the local level (see 
                                                          
2 I use the WRLURI value and Gyourko et.al. 2008’s data in my own research and 
explain more fully how it is derived in Section III.  
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for example, Pollakowski et al. 1990, Glaeser et al. 2002, Fernald et al. 2015, Clark et al. 
1996).  
Studies on housing patterns such as price elasticity, affordability of housing, and 
demographic variables are extensive (see for example, Meen 2016, Saiz 2010, Glaeser et 
al. 2008, Pendall et al. 2006, Clark et al. 1996, Resseger 2013, and Glaeser et al. 2002). 
John Quigley et al. (2005) summarize and review the history of past empirical analyses of 
land use policy on housing prices. They primarily note the variety of the quality and the 
strength of the results in the existing literature. From the myriad of studies done, at the 
root of these trends, Allan Goodman (1988) suggests that there are at least two broad 
motives in the housing market: general consumption and long-term investment. Differing 
intentions produce differing tenure and quality decisions regarding a person’s dwelling. 
Owning versus renting is a popular perspective to assume when parsing out the housing 
market. However, this perspective narrowly examines the housing “norm,” i.e., single-
family homes (Song et al. 2004).  
There is very little research on the housing economics of multi-family housing. 
The main exception by Seong Lee et al. (2000) examines the utility of multi-family 
housing by doing an empirical analysis on the relationship between tenure choices and 
housing choices made between 1980 and 1990. He concludes that where housing prices 
are high, people choose to live in multi-family structures though the investment loses its 
potential within 10 years (Lee et al. 2000). While Lee’s study is one of few that look at 
multi-family housing options, he does not account for land use policy as I do in my study. 
Furthermore, given the fiscal and social impact of the economic crisis in 2008, I argue 
that a more recent empirical study of these effects is necessary.  
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Since land use is determined at the local level, many land use policy and housing 
studies focus on either specific places, specific policies, or how one of these influences 
on macro housing trends. My study begins to rectify the lack of comparative MSA 
research and contribute to the very few studies on varied dwelling options. I aim to 
identify a relationship between policies in MSAs across the nation and the 
microeconomic housing patterns. Examining many MSAs nationwide in one study, rather 
than in isolation, makes comparisons between similar cities easier. In order to do this, I 
broadly take into account the local land use regulatory environments using the aggregate 
index developed by previous researchers. Thus, my study provides a unified pool of 
regulation and microeconomic housing information to better identify the most effective 
regulation to meet the changing housing supply and demand. 
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III. Data Sources 
I use data from two sources. The first data set is the Wharton Land Regulation 
Data (WLRD) provided by Gyourko, Saiz, and Summer (2008).3 Regulation can most 
obviously influence development by entirely prohibiting building, but there are also 
informal means of blocking development such as plan approval delay, design restriction, 
and even court involvement. The WLRD examines both formal and informal means of 
regulation by surveying the local regulatory environment of 2,649 municipalities in 2005 
(Gyourko et al. 2008).4 The survey does not ask about specific constraints or policies, but 
rather inquires as to who is involved in the processes, the current building limits and 
other constraints, and the outcomes of the regulatory process. Respondents give answers 
based on quantifiable scales. For example, answers to the question, “How involved is the 
state legislature in affecting residential building activities and/or growth management 
procedures,” assume values ranging from one to five, with a higher score indicating a 
greater role and influence of the state legislature. In addition to the survey, Gyourko et al. 
2008 supplements their data: first, with a prior state-level analysis that rates legal, 
legislative, and executive policies on a common scale in terms of activity; then, with 
measures of community pressure based on environmental and open space-related ballot 
initiatives. Responses to the survey, as well as the supplementary information, are a 
monumental aggregate of the complex nuances of local regulation policies. 
                                                          
3 The data is available at http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~gyourko/landusesurvey.html. 
4  15 specific survey questions were answered and then used to create a series of sub-
indexes that quantify different aspects of a local regulatory environment. To keep the 
sample as large as possible, WLRD imputed information for some observations. See 
Gyourko et al. 2008 pp 18. 
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These quantitative responses are grouped according to topic, and then summed to 
create 11 sub-indexes based on the following: local political pressure, state political 
involvement, state court involvement, local zoning approval, local project approval, local 
assembly, supply restrictions, density restrictions, open space availability, exactions, and 
approval delay.5 Each index assigns values to various community traits such that lower 
values correspond with less restrictive land use regulation. From the values of these sub-
indexes, a single value, the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulation Index (WRLURI), 
is determined through factor analysis and standardization so the sample mean equals zero 
and the standard deviation equals one (for a more detailed description of the construction 
of the index see Gyourko et al. 2008 pp 20-27). While rules and regulations change 
seldom and slowly, they do in fact change. Ideally, Gyourko et al. 2008 would have 
collected land use regulation data every year so my study could compile an even more 
precise measure of the relationship between regulation and housing choice. Nevertheless, 
WLRD is a very comprehensive dataset, though I do exclude 116 MSAs with missing 
WRLURI values from my study given this is the key variable of interest. 
The second data source is the American Community Survey (ACS) of various 
years (i.e. 2005 to 2011).6 I focus on this time-period because it begins in the year the 
WLRD was collected. Furthermore, it encompasses the 2008 financial crisis in a manner 
that not only shows its effects, but also ensures that results yield a true pattern despite 
temporal factors. The main variables of interest from the ACS are ownership status and 
                                                          
5 For more in-depth definitions of each sub-index including equations, see Appendix 1. 
6 The data is available at https://usa.ipums.org/usa/. It should also be noted that some 
information is based on respondents’ estimations.  
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units in structure as they reflect individuals’ dwelling choices. Other variables of interest 
include annual property taxes, total household income and travel time to work. 
I generate indicator variables for the qualitative data. Specifically, units in 
structure is parsed out into four indicator variables: houses, apartments, duplexes, and 
alternative housing.7 For example, the apartment indicator variable equals one if an 
individual’s housing is an apartment and zero otherwise. I analogously create indicator 
variables for houses, duplexes, and alternative housing. I also parse age of the structure 
into categories so that if the house or apartment building was built within a certain 
twenty-year period, the indicator variable for that timespan equals one. For example, if 
the structure is built between 1939 and 1959, a value of one is given for the variable 
ageofstru1959 and a value of zero is given for all other age of structure categories. Five 
indicator variables reflect the age of the structure. Similarly, I create six indicator 
variables to account for the number of bedrooms. If a unit had two bedrooms, the variable 
bdrms2 equals one and all other bedroom dummy variables equal zero. I create variables 
representing educational attainment levels in the same manner. I generate indicator 
variables if respondents attended less than high school (less than grade 12), high school 
(completed grade 12), some college (less than four years), or college (four or more 
years). There are five mutually exclusive indicator variables accounting for 
race/ethnicity: white, black, Asian, Hispanic, and other race. I assign a value of one for 
the race/ethnicity variable with which the individual identifies; all other race/ethnicity 
variables are given a value of zero. Marital status is another indicator variable where if 
                                                          
7 Apartments are also referred to as condominiums or condos. Alternative housing 
implies an individual’s dwelling is a mobile home, tent, boat, etc. 
18 
 
the individual is married, then the variable equals one. Yet another indicator variable is 
created for mortgage status; if they pay a mortgage, then the variable assumes a value of 
one. Finally, I account for ownership status using an indicator variable, “renter.” When 
equal to one, that individual is a renter; when equal to zero, that individual owns the unit. 
For quantitative ACS data reported in dollars, such as rent, condominium fees, 
household income, and dwelling value, I first convert values into 1999-dollar values 
using a CPI multiplier. Then, I take the natural log in order to account for any non-linear 
relationships between these variables and the dependent variable.8 I account for travel 
time to work in minutes.  
After adjusting any incongruent MSA codes in the ACS data to match the MSA 
codes in WLRD, I merge the two data sets by MSA code. 420,687 observations are 
deleted because they could not be matched to MSAs in the WLRD zoning.9,10 
Additionally, I restrict the sample to the population that is validly making a housing 
choice, that is, individuals 18 years of age and older (this restriction further reduces the 
sample by 300,034 observations). Finally, I omit 300,710 observations that reported 
living in “alternative housing”, such as a mobile home, boat, or tent. I believe this 
category is not meaningfully consistent because it jointly categorizes people living on 
yachts with people living in tents. These housing choices are so fundamentally different 
from a house, apartment, or duplex that estimation results are likely to have omitted 
                                                          
8 Before the log of the quantitative variable is generated, all values are increased by 0.5 
so as to prevent taking the log of 0. 
9 In each year of the ACS data, ~800,000 observations were missing and thus dropped; 
730 observations were missing from the WLRD; and an additional ~60,000 observations 
were deleted as a result of a failure to merge. 
10 To see a complete list of MSAs and the number of observations within each MSA see 
Appendix 2. 
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variable bias or significant outlier values that would skew results of the other housing 
choices. The final sample size is 9,907,514 observations and 267 MSAs spanning 7 years. 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics by dwelling type. For respondents that live in 
single-family houses, 88.5% own and 11.5% rent. In contrast, for respondents that live in 
multi-family dwellings, 13% own the unit and 87% rent. 64% of single-family dwellers 
are married, which is nearly double that of those who live in multi-family units. About 
50% of single-family homes have three bedrooms and about 50% of multi-family 
apartments have two bedrooms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, respondents living in a single-
family house have the highest average household incomes – about $75,000 annually. In 
comparison, respondents living in an apartment earn about $41,000. However, 
interestingly, the mean dwelling value of multi-family units are about six times greater 
than the value of single-family houses, which is on average $1.1 million. This might be a 
result of multi-family units being in locations that are more desirable and having more 
amenities, such as pools and concierges. Comparatively, apartment rent values average 
$586 monthly. While there might be more access to traditional urban luxuries by living in 
a multi-family unit, average travel times to work have a mean of about 15 minutes for 
individuals in both single-family homes and multi-family homes.  
 In sum, on average single-family dwelling occupants tend to be white, married, 
earning about $75,000 a year and their homes have about three bedrooms. On average, 
multi-family complex dwellers tend to be white (though Hispanics comprise 21% of the 
population living in multi-family units), unmarried, earning about $41,000 annually and 
their homes have about two bedrooms.  
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The overall mean WRLURI value is 0.215.11 The minimum WRLURI value is -
2.024 recorded in Kansas City, MO-KS; the max is 4.796 recorded in Barnstable-
Yarmouth, MA; the standard deviation is 0.942. The mean WRLURI value for those 
living in houses is 0.192; for those in multi-family apartments it is 0.294. To greater 
contextualize these averages: Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI has a WRLURI value of 0.25, 
roughly the overall mean of this data set. Akron, OH has a WRLURI value of 0.15 and 
Portland, OR has a WRLURI value of 0.29, which are roughly the mean WRLURI values 
of living in a house and in an apartment respectively. While this study primarily focuses 
on the differences between single-family houses and multi-family apartments, it is 
interesting to note, that for individuals living in duplexes, the WRLURI is nearly three 
times greater than that of single-family houses (see Table 1 column 3).  
Appendix 4 breaks the summary statistics down by quartile of WRLURI values. 
As the WRLURI vales increase, the average number of single-family dwellers decreases 
and vice versa for multi-family dwellers. Furthermore, all monetary factors increase as 
WRLURI values increase. Rent in the lowest quartile averages $146.60 monthly while 
the fourth quartile averages $214.08 monthly. In contrast, house values in MSAs with the 
strictest land use policies are more than $250,000 greater than the house values in MSAs 
with the most laissez-faire policies. Finally, individuals living in MSAs with low 
WRLURI values make an average of $61,939 annually, while those living in MSAs with 
                                                          
11 Appendix 3 shows the summary statistics for the WRLD portion of the data set. 
Gyourko et al. 2008’s analysis of the WLRD shows the mean WRLURI values to be 
0.14. They find that communities with values within 1/10th of a standard deviation from 
this mean are spread across the nation. The disparity between Gyourko et al. 2008’s mean 
and the mean of this study, as well as the other summary statistics results from some 
MSA’s being dropped. 
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high WRLURI values make an average of $74,251. These statistics suggest that where 
there is greater land regulation, there are more expensive housing options that require 
higher incomes. The remainder of the paper formally analyzes the relationship between 
these MSA regulatory environment statistics and these individual housing statistics.  
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IV. Empirical Strategy and Results 
I use three empirical strategies to examine the effect of land use policies on 
people’s housing decisions. The first compares the probabilities of living in a single-
family home verses living in a multi-family unit. The second simply examines the 
likelihood of being a renter. The third compares rent values and home values. I discuss 
each in turn. 
A. Probability of Living in a Single Family vs. Multi-Family Unit 
The first model estimates the effects of WRLURI on the probability that a 
respondent lives in a multi-family apartment complex compared to living in a single-
family home.12 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ∅ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇 𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (1) 
where i indicates the individual observation provided by the ACS, t indicates the year, 
and m indicates the metropolitan statistical area.  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the respondents’ housing choice – either a single-family house, an apartment, 
or a duplex depending on the regression. First, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the probability that a 
respondent lives in a house versus an apartment, Pr  (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 1| 𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷 = 0). The 
independent variable, 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is the area’s land use policy stringency and is the 
primary explanatory variable of interest in this study. 𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a categorical 
variable assessing the ownership status of the dwelling. 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, is an umbrella term for 
demographic variables, which include marital status, race, educational attainment, 
employment status, and travel time to work. Likewise, 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents both 
                                                          
12 In order to properly make this comparison, two additional regressions using equation 1 
are run to assess the probabilities of choosing other housing options. 
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economic and structural variables: property tax dummy variables, age of the structure, 
and the number of bedrooms in the unit. 𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊 represents year fixed effects. The regressions 
use maximum likelihood to estimate the coefficients. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the error term 
calculated using the delta method on the marginal effects of the probit model.13 I present 
the marginal effects of the regression as opposed to the coefficients as they are easier to 
interpret.  
For ease of comparison and because there are no variables that identify each 
housing choice individually, equation 1 is used twice more to account for the two other 
nominal outcome variables, living in an apartment or living in a duplex: First where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 
represents the probability that a respondent lives in a house versus a duplex, Pr  (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 1| 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 0) and second where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the probability that a 
respondent lives in a duplex versus an apartment, Pr  (𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1| 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 0). 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 show the overall results of each outcome respectively. I first 
estimate equation 1 with just WRLURI and then successively add control variables. The 
results from these specifications are presented in tables 3, 4, and 5. 
As seen in Table 3, excluding renter, demographic, and economic variables, a one 
unit increase in WRLURI value causes a 1.7% decrease in the probability that an 
individual with live in a single-family home (or a 1.7% increase in the likelihood that an 
individual lives in a multi-family apartment). When I add the dummy renter variable to 
the model, the WRLURI impact results remain roughly unchanged. Thus, I conclude that 
land use policy has the same effect on housing choice regardless of whether the occupant 
                                                          
13 It should be noted that this data only allows for variation across household; not within 
household. However, I account for this by clustering standard errors by household. 
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owns or rents their dwelling. However, if the occupant is a renter, they are 59% more 
likely to choose to rent an apartment.14  
When all explanatory variables are included in the housing choice model, 
WRLURI has an expected slightly lesser impact on housing choice than when it is the 
sole explanatory variable. A one unit increase in WRLURI value causes about a 1% 
decrease in the probability that an individual with live in a single-family home.15 In other 
words, this is a 1% increase in the probability that one lives in an apartment. To offer 
greater contextualization, a person living in San Francisco, CA (WRLURI = 0.9) is 1% 
more likely to live in a multi-family structure than a person in Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 
(WRLURI = -0.1). Conversely, a person is 1% more likely to live in a single-family 
home if they are in Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT than if they are in San Francisco, CA. This 
suggests that stricter land use regulation encourages people to live in multi-family units 
and deters people from single-family units.  
While the regulatory environment does influence housing choice, in reality, 
people consciously or sub-consciously take into account more individualized, more 
pertinent factors when choosing their home. Thus, it is important to note that the other 
control variables that had a significant impact on housing choice. If the individual is a 
renter, they are 31 percentage points more likely to choose an apartment. Being married 
has a 2.4 percentage point impact on choosing to live in a house. Asians were the most 
likely of the racial and ethnic groups to live in an apartment. If the structure is built 
                                                          
14 The next part of this section of the paper further explores the causal relationship 
between WRLURI and ownership status.  
15 WRLURI marginal coefficients with no explanatory variables and with all explanatory 
variables are both significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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between 1999 and 2014, that person is about 6 percentage points more likely to be in an 
apartment.  
B. Probability of Renting 
I next estimate a probit model that predicts the probability that a respondent rents 
(rather than owns), Pr(𝐴𝐴 = 1).  Pr(𝐴𝐴 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇 𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where all other variables are previously defined. The marginal effects for equation 2 are 
presented in Table 6. A one unit increase in the WRLURI value causes a 0.6% increase in 
the probability of a respondent being a renter. To put this in greater context: Nassau-
Suffolk, NY has a WRLURI value of 0.8; San Francisco, CA has a WRLURI value of 
0.9; thus a respondent is 0.06% more likely to rent their dwelling in San Francisco than in 
Nassau-Suffolk. In a more dramatic example, a person is about 0.6% more likely to rent 
in Philadelphia, PA than in Atlanta, GA.16  
This indicates firstly that there is indeed a relationship between land use 
regulation and home ownership status. Secondly, it suggests that in areas of greater 
regulation, people are more likely to rent their dwelling. Additionally, when considering 
the coefficients of fixed year effects, note that in 2006 and 2007 the regulation index 
value has less impact on people’s decisions to rent compared to 2005.17 Then, in 2008, 
the impact of residential land use regulation increases from 0.02% to 1.4% compared to 
the impact of WRLURI in 2005. Then, from 2009 to 2011, a one-unit increase in 
WRLURI values continues to have more and more influence over people’s decisions to 
                                                          
16 Atlanta, GA has an average WRLURI value of 0.04; Philadelphia, PA has an average 
WRLURI value of 1.03 
17 Regressions run with only 2005 data and can be found in Tables 9 and 10. 
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own versus rent compared to 2005. Relative to 2005, by 2011, WRLURI values influence 
the probability of an individual being a renter by 4.5% which is a much greater impact 
than 2006’s estimated 0.23% impact.  
C. Comparison of Rent Values and Dwelling Values 
The third approach I use to study the effects of land use policy on housing choice 
is comprised of two linear, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Having just 
regressed the stringency of land use regulation policy on the probability of being a renter, 
I now examine the impact of WRLURI values on the fiscal factors of each dwelling type 
while controlling for ownership status. Because there are slightly different economic 
factors associated with owning or renting each dwelling type, I use two different 
equations. 
First, I examine how land use regulation impacts rent values of apartments 
conditional to the respondent being a renter:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ∅ 𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜇𝜇 𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (3) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the natural log of rent. 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the natural log of the 
respondent’s household income, 𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the natural log of the dwelling value, and 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
Table 7 shows the results of equation 3. A 10% increase in income corresponds to 
a 2.8% increase in rent. This suggests that the more income an apartment renter has, the 
nicer and more expensive dwelling (as quantified by higher rent) they will occupy. 
Interestingly, however, a 10% increase in multi-family dwelling value causes rent to 
decrease by 0.01%. There may be a greater influence than either household income or the 
dwelling value that causes this inverse relationship -- land regulation policy stringency. 
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A one-unit increase in WRLURI values correspond with a 7.7% increase in rent. 
Policies that are more restrictive seem to create a higher premium on living in that area. 
Thus, rent prices increase. Often times, people equate higher rent with a lack of land 
availability. However, land scarcity is not the motivator of these more restrictive policies 
and thus cannot be the cause of high rents (Gyourko et al. 2008). Land use regulation 
policies are not intended to affect rent prices, nevertheless they are clearly correlated 
(United States of America. Department of Commerce 1928). Regardless of how 
deliberate these effects are, the data of this study suggests simply that where there is 
greater regulation, there is significantly higher rent.  
 Next, I examine how land use regulation impacts dwelling values of single-family 
homes conditional to the respondent being an owner.18 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇 𝑌𝑌𝑊𝑊 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖        (4) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the natural log of dwelling value. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 measures property taxes, 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual pays a mortgage, and zero otherwise, 
and all other variables are as previously defined. Table 8 shows the results.  
Property taxes have a negative impact on single-family home values until the 
property taxes are in the top bracket (i.e. between $4000 and $5000). This suggests that 
where property taxes are in the highest bracket, which are likely prime pieces of land, the 
value of the dwelling is likewise higher. Then, when a person is paying a mortgage (as 
opposed to owning the dwelling outright), the value of the unit will increase 4% 
presumably because it costs more to buy outright. When household income increases 
                                                          
18 This regression is treated as a pseudo comparison to rent value because I provide for 
homeownership expenses not relatable to rent such a property taxes, homeowner’s 
insurance, maintenance, etcetera, though the equation only accounts for property taxes.  
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10%, the dwelling value also increases by 3.6%. Thus, when income increases by the 
same amount, dwelling value increases 1% more than rent. However, this is not the only 
instance in which an explanatory variable has greater influence over the single-family 
dwelling values than multi-family unit rent values. 
The WRLURI has a doubled effect on single-family dwelling value. A one unit 
increase in WRLURI value shows a 20% increase in dwelling value. Recalling that an 
increase in land use regulation policy resulted in a 7.6% increase in rent for renters of 
apartments, there is a 12.4% greater impact on dwelling value for single-family home 
owners than rent value for apartment renters. While people purchasing homes likely do 
not account for local zoning practices, the types of neighborhoods and areas that have 
higher value dwellings clearly have significant land-use regulation. Such regulation 
might increase single-family dwelling values because it provides an implicit layer of 
security that the land around the home will be used properly. Thus, if local governments 
more heavily regulate land use, then people are more likely to make the investment of 
owning a single-family home.  
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V. Conclusions 
Land use regulation may not be the most obvious influencer of housing, but it 
indeed impacts individuals’ daily lives as well as society at large. Residential land use 
policy is determined at the local level and is thus immensely varied across the nation. 
While several studies have been done examining specific policies in specific areas, this is 
the first to use an aggregate measure to compare metropolitan statistical areas. 
Furthermore, the social “norm” of single-family houses seems to be fading – a pattern 
that current housing studies have minimally explored. My study confronts this directly by 
comparing decisions to live in a single-family home verses a multi-family apartment 
complex. While, land use policy aims to correct for negative externalities, their adverse 
effects are greater than their benefits. In particular, they seem to limit housing supply and 
unjustly factor into individuals’ housing choices. 
In this paper, I find that land use regulation policy affects people’s decisions on 
whether to live in single-family versus multi-family housing. Building off Joseph 
Gyourko et al. 2008’s index measuring residential land use policy and using individual 
housing data provided by the American Community Survey, I estimate econometric 
models to explore the relationship of land use policy and housing choice. I find that more 
stringent land use policies decrease the likelihood of living in a single-family home and 
increase the probability of living in a multi-family apartment complex by about 1%. 
Furthermore, land use policy slightly influences the probability of being a renter either of 
a single-family or of a multi-family dwelling thus making some areas more owner-
friendly than others. In addition to land use policy, household income plays a significant 
role in fiscal determinants of different housing options. When household income 
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increases, single-family homeowners’ dwelling values increase about 5% more than 
apartment rent values. These results are consistent with the theory that the benefits of 
zoning might not be outweighing the costs that they incur. Tighter regulatory 
environments indeed increase housing affordability and influence people’s housing 
decisions. 
 Since zoning practices vary extensively across the country, my study provides a 
general overview of the direction and magnitude that various regulation influences have 
on individual housing choices. However, it is worth noting that individuals’ housing 
decisions do not always reflect their ideal state – rather they are a product of the available 
choices given their current state. Fiscal restrictions and geographic requirements often 
limit individuals. Additionally, my results suggest that land use regulation also influences 
people’s choices. This might cause unnatural development patterns by forcing people 
away from more desirable locations, such as places with larger job markets. The struggle 
may not be finding housing, but rather that a person is forced to choose to live 
somewhere other than their ideal location because their housing options are not ideal. In 
essence, a person may want to live in a single family house, but they cannot afford it 
because of the effects of land use policy. Rather than policies accommodating an increase 
in demand for housing, they seem to change the supply.  
This knowledge is important because changing social norms, expanding housing 
options, and fluctuating economic conditions inevitably change the housing demand. 
With great power, comes great responsibility -- since local governments have the power 
to, at least inadvertently, influence housing patterns through regulation, then it is the 
laws’ responsibility to meet those demands, or at least provide an opportunity for those 
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demands to be met. Given that land use is determined at a local level and that it impacts 
on individual lives, if citizens are unhappy with their housing options, then they should 
be able to work with the government to make it better. The first step to developing 
communities fairly is understanding how the government influences the choices that 
individuals have. 
Future studies now have the opportunity to utilize Gyourko et al. 2008’s 
Residential Land Use Regulation Index to explore the many ways that policy can 
influence individuals’ daily lives. For example, one might explore the relationship of land 
use policy stringency and crime rates or strength of school districts. Alternatively, in the 
vein of land regulation, future studies might examine the effects of specific policies, such 
as innovative form-based codes that are challenging traditional zoning practices, on 
housing choices.19  
  
                                                          
19 For more information on new kinds of land use regulation policies see Form-Based 
Codes Institute (Goldsmith). 
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  Table 1: Summary Statistics by Dwelling Type 
  
House 
(1) 
Apartment 
(2) 
Duplex 
(3) 
  
 
             
 
             
 
             
 Variable Name mean sd mean sd mean sd 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
owns dwelling 0.885 0.319 0.130 0.337 0.350 0.477 
rents dwelling 0.115 0.319 0.870 0.337 0.650 0.477 
Wharton Index 0.192 0.944 0.294 0.915 0.342 1.005 
property taxes ~1000 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.007 
property taxes ~2000 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 
property taxes ~3000 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 
property taxes ~4000 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.004 
property taxes ~5000 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 
pays mortgage 0.654 0.476 0.088 0.284 0.232 0.422 
no mortgage; owns 0.232 0.422 0.042 0.201 0.118 0.322 
rent (in dollar value)  $          88.95   $        287.26   $        586.67   $       426.89   $        416.86   $        419.14  
log rent 0.131 2.297 5.430 2.443 3.858 3.374 
log condo fee -0.495 1.044 0.105 2.073 -0.550 0.914 
household income  
(in dollar value)  $  74,872.94   $  67,806.15   $  40,757.80   $ 47,111.91   $  47,286.79   $  45,990.69  
log household income 10.911 0.850 10.194 1.012 10.390 0.966 
dwelling value  
(in dollar value)  $  1,128,637   $  2,443,805   $  6,903,074   $ 2,602,667   $  5,242,227   $  3,634,945  
log dwelling value 12.551 1.424 15.383 1.321 14.638 1.770 
linguistically iso~d 0.034 0.182 0.121 0.326 0.095 0.293 
not linguistically~d 0.966 0.182 0.879 0.326 0.905 0.293 
structure built~1939 0.122 0.328 0.133 0.339 0.380 0.485 
structure built~1959 0.207 0.405 0.125 0.331 0.220 0.414 
structure built~1979 0.269 0.443 0.330 0.470 0.219 0.414 
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structure built~1999 0.268 0.443 0.292 0.455 0.131 0.337 
structure built~2014 0.135 0.341 0.120 0.325 0.051 0.219 
no bedrooms 0.002 0.041 0.044 0.205 0.016 0.125 
1 bedroom 0.013 0.112 0.346 0.476 0.125 0.331 
2 bedrooms 0.138 0.345 0.482 0.500 0.439 0.496 
3 bedrooms 0.493 0.500 0.110 0.312 0.276 0.447 
4 bedrooms 0.278 0.448 0.014 0.116 0.084 0.277 
5 or more bedrooms 0.077 0.266 0.005 0.072 0.061 0.239 
married 0.638 0.481 0.327 0.469 0.389 0.488 
1 family in unit 0.903 0.296 0.800 0.400 0.792 0.406 
more than 1 family~t 0.097 0.296 0.200 0.400 0.208 0.406 
not married 0.362 0.481 0.673 0.469 0.611 0.488 
white race 0.722 0.448 0.523 0.499 0.541 0.498 
black race 0.087 0.282 0.159 0.366 0.182 0.386 
Asian race 0.055 0.227 0.088 0.283 0.063 0.243 
other race 0.016 0.125 0.023 0.148 0.021 0.144 
Hispanic ethnicity 0.120 0.325 0.207 0.405 0.193 0.395 
does not speak eng~h 0.013 0.112 0.036 0.187 0.032 0.175 
does  speak English 0.987 0.112 0.964 0.187 0.968 0.175 
< high school 0.095 0.293 0.148 0.355 0.177 0.382 
High school 0.350 0.477 0.331 0.470 0.396 0.489 
some college 0.231 0.422 0.224 0.417 0.210 0.407 
college educated 0.324 0.468 0.297 0.457 0.217 0.412 
employed 0.632 0.482 0.608 0.488 0.604 0.489 
not in labor force 0.323 0.468 0.329 0.470 0.328 0.469 
not employed 0.044 0.205 0.062 0.242 0.068 0.252 
travel time to work 15.522 21.208 15.088 20.786 15.479 21.762 
  
 
  
 
      
Observations      7,863,968                 1,709,314                        334,232                 
Total Observations      9,907,514    
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TABLE 2 -- Equation 1 
Marginal Effects of Probability of Housing Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES House v 
Apartment 
House v 
Duplex 
Duplex v 
Apartment 
    
Wharton Regulation Index -0.00920*** -0.00319*** 0.00535*** 
 (7.43e-05) (3.81e-05) (0.000255) 
rents dwelling -0.312*** -0.103*** 0.106*** 
 (0.000567) (0.000393) (0.00108) 
married 0.0235*** 0.00683*** -0.00945*** 
 (0.000156) (8.42e-05) (0.000520) 
black race -0.0186*** -0.0127*** 0.00155** 
 (0.000272) (0.000170) (0.000671) 
Asian race -0.0369*** -0.0128*** 0.0303*** 
 (0.000437) (0.000248) (0.000821) 
Hispanic ethnicity -0.0171*** -0.00474*** 0.0292*** 
 (0.000240) (0.000128) (0.000595) 
other race -0.00396*** -0.00306*** 0.00723*** 
 (0.000518) (0.000308) (0.00157) 
High school -0.00489*** 0.000630*** 0.00695*** 
 (0.000232) (0.000113) (0.000712) 
some college -0.0162*** 0.00232*** 0.0326*** 
 (0.000288) (0.000119) (0.000722) 
college educated -0.0424*** 0.00277*** 0.0719*** 
 (0.000329) (0.000123) (0.000678) 
employed 0.0100*** 0.00209*** -0.0198*** 
 (0.000183) (9.59e-05) (0.000598) 
travel time to work -0.000109*** -6.35e-05*** 0.000143*** 
 (3.94e-06) (2.02e-06) (1.38e-05) 
property taxes < $2000 0.301*** 0.0306*** -0.529*** 
 (0.0186) (0.00844) (0.0883) 
property taxes < $3000 0.387*** -0.341*** -3.136*** 
 (0.0190) (0.00738) (0.0871) 
property taxes < $4000 0.391*** -0.500*** -4.632*** 
 (0.0215) (0.00780) (0.0976) 
property taxes < $5000 0.207*** -0.737*** -7.303*** 
 (0.0291) (0.00965) (0.125) 
structure built before 1959 0.0255*** 0.0164*** 0.0365*** 
 (0.000179) (6.64e-05) (0.000616) 
structure built before 1979 -0.0372*** 0.0183*** 0.130*** 
 (0.000300) (7.46e-05) (0.000494) 
structure built before 1999 -0.0525*** 0.0214*** 0.154*** 
 (0.000340) (7.82e-05) (0.000448) 
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structure built before 2014 -0.0594*** 0.0181*** 0.130*** 
 (0.000480) (6.40e-05) (0.000352) 
1 bedroom 0.00117** 0.00529*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.000571) (0.000306) (0.00159) 
2 bedrooms 0.0507*** 0.0134*** -0.116*** 
 (0.000288) (0.000208) (0.00155) 
3 bedrooms 0.202*** 0.0477*** -0.299*** 
 (0.000829) (0.000614) (0.00270) 
4 bedrooms 0.138*** 0.0323*** -0.471*** 
 (0.000389) (0.000262) (0.00361) 
5 or more bedrooms 0.0594*** 0.0160*** -0.564*** 
 (0.000147) (0.000107) (0.00395) 
year2006 0.000167 0.000366*** 0.00187** 
 (0.000258) (0.000135) (0.000890) 
year2007 0.000856*** 0.000985*** 0.00187** 
 (0.000256) (0.000132) (0.000893) 
year2008 0.000583** 0.000608*** -0.000217 
 (0.000258) (0.000135) (0.000902) 
year2009 0.00190*** 0.00164*** 0.00282*** 
 (0.000251) (0.000129) (0.000887) 
year2010 0.00336*** 0.00205*** 0.000387 
 (0.000244) (0.000126) (0.000888) 
year2011 0.00746*** 0.00232*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.000231) (0.000124) (0.000919) 
    
Observations 9,573,282 8,198,200 2,043,546 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 3 -- Equation 1 
Marginal Effects of Probability of Living in a House vs. Apartment 
VARIABLES House v 
Apartment 
House v 
Apartment 
House v 
Apartment 
House v 
Apartment 
     
Wharton Regulation Index -0.0169*** -0.0165*** -0.0138*** -0.00920*** 
 (0.000131) (0.000108) (0.000105) (7.43e-05) 
rents dwelling  -0.592*** -0.570*** -0.312*** 
  (0.000321) (0.000361) (0.000567) 
married   0.0662*** 0.0235*** 
   (0.000222) (0.000156) 
black race   -0.000987*** -0.0186*** 
   (0.000310) (0.000272) 
Asian race   -0.0501*** -0.0369*** 
   (0.000517) (0.000437) 
Hispanic ethnicity   -0.0198*** -0.0171*** 
   (0.000319) (0.000240) 
other race   0.00389*** -0.00396*** 
   (0.000677) (0.000518) 
High school   -0.00836*** -0.00489*** 
   (0.000340) (0.000232) 
some college   -0.0220*** -0.0162*** 
   (0.000396) (0.000288) 
college educated   -0.0709*** -0.0424*** 
   (0.000437) (0.000329) 
employed   0.0237*** 0.0100*** 
   (0.000263) (0.000183) 
travel time to work   -0.000154*** -0.000109*** 
   (5.64e-06) (3.94e-06) 
property taxes < $2000    0.301*** 
    (0.0186) 
property taxes < $3000    0.387*** 
    (0.0190) 
property taxes < $4000    0.391*** 
    (0.0215) 
property taxes < $5000    0.207*** 
    (0.0291) 
structure built before 1959    0.0255*** 
    (0.000179) 
structure built before 1979    -0.0372*** 
    (0.000300) 
structure built before 1999    -0.0525*** 
    (0.000340) 
structure built before 2014    -0.0594*** 
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    (0.000480) 
1 bedroom    0.00117** 
    (0.000571) 
2 bedrooms    0.0507*** 
    (0.000288) 
3 bedrooms    0.202*** 
    (0.000829) 
4 bedrooms    0.138*** 
    (0.000389) 
5 or more bedrooms    0.0594*** 
    (0.000147) 
year2006 -0.000109 0.00116*** 0.00128*** 0.000167 
 (0.000468) (0.000383) (0.000368) (0.000258) 
year2007 0.00144*** 0.00242*** 0.00310*** 0.000856*** 
 (0.000465) (0.000379) (0.000363) (0.000256) 
year2008 -0.00427*** 0.00339*** 0.00444*** 0.000583** 
 (0.000475) (0.000379) (0.000362) (0.000258) 
year2009 -0.00510*** 0.00646*** 0.00818*** 0.00190*** 
 (0.000472) (0.000369) (0.000350) (0.000251) 
year2010 -0.0115*** 0.00786*** 0.0106*** 0.00336*** 
 (0.000476) (0.000364) (0.000342) (0.000244) 
year2011 -0.00905*** 0.0151*** 0.0174*** 0.00746*** 
 (0.000476) (0.000349) (0.000327) (0.000231) 
     
Observations 9,573,282 9,573,282 9,573,282 9,573,282 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE 4 – Equation 1 
Marginal Effects of Probability of Living in a House vs. Duplex 
VARIABLES House v 
Duplex 
House v 
Duplex 
House v 
Duplex 
House v 
Duplex 
     
Wharton Regulation Index -0.00623*** -0.00529*** -0.00518*** -0.00319*** 
 (7.02e-05) (5.23e-05) (5.04e-05) (3.81e-05) 
rents dwelling  -0.178*** -0.152*** -0.103*** 
  (0.000378) (0.000380) (0.000393) 
married   0.0147*** 0.00683*** 
   (0.000115) (8.42e-05) 
black race   -0.0133*** -0.0127*** 
   (0.000201) (0.000170) 
Asian race   -0.0102*** -0.0128*** 
   (0.000270) (0.000248) 
Hispanic ethnicity   -0.00490*** -0.00474*** 
   (0.000161) (0.000128) 
other race   -0.00201*** -0.00306*** 
   (0.000380) (0.000308) 
High school   0.00385*** 0.000630*** 
   (0.000148) (0.000113) 
some college   0.00773*** 0.00232*** 
   (0.000146) (0.000119) 
college educated   0.00682*** 0.00277*** 
   (0.000158) (0.000123) 
employed   0.00404*** 0.00209*** 
   (0.000129) (9.59e-05) 
travel time to work   -7.91e-05*** -6.35e-05*** 
   (2.70e-06) (2.02e-06) 
property taxes < $2000    0.0306*** 
    (0.00844) 
property taxes < $3000    -0.341*** 
    (0.00738) 
property taxes < $4000    -0.500*** 
    (0.00780) 
property taxes < $5000    -0.737*** 
    (0.00965) 
structure built before 1959    0.0164*** 
    (6.64e-05) 
structure built before 1979    0.0183*** 
    (7.46e-05) 
structure built before 1999    0.0214*** 
    (7.82e-05) 
structure built before 2014    0.0181*** 
    (6.40e-05) 
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1 bedroom    0.00529*** 
    (0.000306) 
2 bedrooms    0.0134*** 
    (0.000208) 
3 bedrooms    0.0477*** 
    (0.000614) 
4 bedrooms    0.0323*** 
    (0.000262) 
5 or more bedrooms    0.0160*** 
    (0.000107) 
year2006 0.000844*** 0.000968*** 0.00101*** 0.000366*** 
 (0.000254) (0.000186) (0.000177) (0.000135) 
year2007 0.00221*** 0.00215*** 0.00218*** 0.000985*** 
 (0.000250) (0.000182) (0.000173) (0.000132) 
year2008 0.000627** 0.00226*** 0.00221*** 0.000608*** 
 (0.000257) (0.000182) (0.000174) (0.000135) 
year2009 0.00174*** 0.00368*** 0.00365*** 0.00164*** 
 (0.000252) (0.000175) (0.000166) (0.000129) 
year2010 0.000636** 0.00424*** 0.00436*** 0.00205*** 
 (0.000255) (0.000172) (0.000162) (0.000126) 
year2011 -0.00203*** 0.00362*** 0.00402*** 0.00232*** 
 (0.000262) (0.000173) (0.000162) (0.000124) 
     
Observations 8,198,200 8,198,200 8,198,200 8,198,200 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
42 
 
TABLE 5 – Equation 1 
Marginal Effects of Probability of Living in a Duplex vs. Apartment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES person lives 
in MF 
complex 
person lives 
in MF 
complex 
person lives 
in MF 
complex 
person lives 
in MF 
complex 
     
Wharton Land Use Index -0.00735*** 0.000166 -0.00205*** 0.00535*** 
 (0.000275) (0.000273) (0.000271) (0.000255) 
rents dwelling  0.217*** 0.232*** 0.106*** 
  (0.000859) (0.000904) (0.00108) 
married   -0.0229*** -0.00945*** 
   (0.000560) (0.000520) 
black race   -0.0261*** 0.00155** 
   (0.000775) (0.000671) 
Asian    0.0358*** 0.0303*** 
   (0.000884) (0.000821) 
Hispanic    0.0194*** 0.0292*** 
   (0.000674) (0.000595) 
other race   -0.000930 0.00723*** 
   (0.00176) (0.00157) 
High school   0.0190*** 0.00695*** 
   (0.000755) (0.000712) 
some college   0.0513*** 0.0326*** 
   (0.000753) (0.000722) 
college educated   0.0962*** 0.0719*** 
   (0.000713) (0.000678) 
employed   -0.0201*** -0.0198*** 
   (0.000640) (0.000598) 
travel time to work   -9.02e-05*** 0.000143*** 
   (1.47e-05) (1.38e-05) 
property taxes < $2000    -0.529*** 
    (0.0883) 
property taxes < $3000    -3.136*** 
    (0.0871) 
property taxes < $4000    -4.632*** 
    (0.0976) 
property taxes < $5000    -7.303*** 
    (0.125) 
structure built before 
1959 
   0.0365*** 
    (0.000616) 
structure built before    0.130*** 
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1979 
    (0.000494) 
structure built before 
1999 
   0.154*** 
    (0.000448) 
structure built before 
2014 
   0.130*** 
    (0.000352) 
1 bedroom    -0.0164*** 
    (0.00159) 
2 bedrooms    -0.116*** 
    (0.00155) 
3 bedrooms    -0.299*** 
    (0.00270) 
4 bedrooms    -0.471*** 
    (0.00361) 
5 or more bedrooms    -0.564*** 
    (0.00395) 
year2006 0.00316*** 0.00247*** 0.00236** 0.00187** 
 (0.000966) (0.000956) (0.000949) (0.000890) 
year2007 0.00736*** 0.00573*** 0.00551*** 0.00187** 
 (0.000958) (0.000950) (0.000943) (0.000893) 
year2008 0.00657*** 0.00503*** 0.00375*** -0.000217 
 (0.000962) (0.000953) (0.000950) (0.000902) 
year2009 0.0112*** 0.00898*** 0.00671*** 0.00282*** 
 (0.000946) (0.000938) (0.000937) (0.000887) 
year2010 0.0128*** 0.00866*** 0.00545*** 0.000387 
 (0.000933) (0.000931) (0.000933) (0.000888) 
year2011 0.00134 -0.00477*** -0.00721*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.000958) (0.000963) (0.000963) (0.000919) 
     
Observations 2,043,546 2,043,546 2,043,546 2,043,546 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6 – Equation 2 
Marginal Effects of Wharton Index on Likelihood of Renting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 (1) 
VARIABLES rents 
dwelling 
  
Wharton Land Use Index 0.00594*** 
 (0.000147) 
Year 2006 0.00229*** 
 (0.000525) 
Year 2007 0.00193*** 
 (0.000523) 
Year 2008 0.0144*** 
 (0.000536) 
Year 2009 0.0207*** 
 (0.000534) 
Year 2010 0.0353*** 
 (0.000540) 
Year 2011 0.0449*** 
 (0.000546) 
  
Observations 10,208,224 
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TABLE 7 – Equation 3 
Effects of Wharton Index on Rent If Renter & Apartment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) 
VARIABLES log rent 
  
Wharton Land Use Index 0.0769*** 
 (0.000505) 
log household income 0.281*** 
 (0.000462) 
log dwelling value -0.00134 
 (0.0122) 
census year = 2006 -0.00203 
 (0.00158) 
census year = 2007 0.000504 
 (0.00151) 
census year = 2008 0.00100 
 (0.00153) 
census year = 2009 0.0290*** 
 (0.00150) 
census year = 2010 0.0364*** 
 (0.00153) 
census year = 2011, omitted - 
  
Constant 3.505*** 
 (0.194) 
  
Observations 1,461,955 
R-squared 0.218 
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TABLE 8 – Equation 4 
Effects of Wharton Index on Dwelling Value If Owner & Single-family Home 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) 
VARIABLES log dwelling value 
  
Wharton Land Use Index 0.200*** 
 (0.000271) 
property taxes < $2000 -28.47*** 
 (0.0455) 
property taxes < $3000 -12.31*** 
 (0.0432) 
property taxes < $4000 -0.0730 
 (0.0466) 
property taxes < $5000 19.44*** 
 (0.0614) 
pays mortgage 0.0408*** 
 (0.000596) 
log household income 0.360*** 
 (0.000329) 
census year = 2006 0.0223*** 
 (0.000947) 
census year = 2007 0.0236*** 
 (0.000945) 
census year = 2008 -0.0469*** 
 (0.000961) 
census year = 2009 -0.104*** 
 (0.000954) 
census year = 2010 -0.130*** 
 (0.000959) 
census year = 2011 -0.210*** 
 (0.000968) 
Constant 8.239*** 
 (0.00359) 
  
Observations 6,939,057 
R-squared 0.327 
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TABLE 9  
Marginal Effects of Wharton Index on Likelihood of Renting for 2005  
 (1) 
VARIABLES rents 
dwelling 
  
Wharton Land Use Index 0.00168*** 
 (0.000399) 
  
Observations 1,429,409 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 10 
Marginal Effects of Probability of Housing Choice for 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES house house apt 
    
Wharton Land Use Index -0.00848*** -
0.00476*** 
0.00406*** 
 (0.000199) (0.000114) (0.000781) 
renter -0.319*** -0.113*** 0.110*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00114) (0.00290) 
Married 0.0219*** 0.00802*** -0.00625*** 
 (0.000403) (0.000235) (0.00141) 
Black -0.0141*** -0.0111*** 0.00460** 
 (0.000683) (0.000449) (0.00183) 
Asian -0.0294*** -
0.00930*** 
0.0333*** 
 (0.00110) (0.000641) (0.00230) 
Hispanic -0.0130*** -
0.00436*** 
0.0339*** 
 (0.000613) (0.000355) (0.00163) 
Other race 0.000364 -
0.00236*** 
0.00757* 
 (0.00128) (0.000852) (0.00445) 
High school -0.00791*** 0.000724** 0.0123*** 
 (0.000595) (0.000304) (0.00191) 
Some college -0.0197*** 0.00261*** 0.0386*** 
 (0.000774) (0.000323) (0.00194) 
college -0.0446*** 0.00285*** 0.0754*** 
 (0.000878) (0.000332) (0.00182) 
Employed  0.0117*** 0.00274*** -0.0229*** 
 (0.000475) (0.000263) (0.00164) 
travel time to work -
0.000101*** 
-4.79e-
05*** 
0.000179*** 
 (1.03e-05) (5.68e-06) (3.86e-05) 
property taxes less than $2000 0.619*** 0.0250 -1.738*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0222) (0.249) 
property taxes less than $3000 0.711*** -0.364*** -4.263*** 
 (0.0515) (0.0196) (0.251) 
property taxes less than $4000 0.857*** -0.395*** -5.467*** 
 (0.0707) (0.0258) (0.345) 
property taxes less than $5000 0.476*** -0.555*** -6.497*** 
 (0.0594) (0.0217) (0.277) 
structure built before 1959 0.0228*** 0.0171*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.000461) (0.000182) (0.00166) 
49 
 
structure built before 1979 -0.0386*** 0.0194*** 0.139*** 
 (0.000779) (0.000205) (0.00137) 
structure built before 1999 -0.0541*** 0.0224*** 0.163*** 
 (0.000888) (0.000216) (0.00125) 
structure built before 2014 -0.0636*** 0.0173*** 0.128*** 
 (0.00150) (0.000166) (0.000939) 
1 bedroom 0.000988 -0.0158*** -0.0885*** 
 (0.00167) (0.00300) (0.00685) 
2 bedrooms 0.0466*** -0.000267 -0.189*** 
 (0.000848) (0.00167) (0.00610) 
3 bedrooms 0.194*** 0.0243*** -0.432*** 
 (0.00256) (0.00188) (0.0105) 
4 bedrooms 0.127*** 0.0199*** -0.615*** 
 (0.00110) (0.00103) (0.0106) 
5 or more bedrooms 0.0523*** 0.00713*** -0.656*** 
 (0.000373) (0.00110) (0.0105) 
    
Observations 1,337,982 1,153,101 279,545 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix 1 – Wharton Sub-Index Construction Details 
Source: Gyourko et al. 2008 
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Appendix 2 
Number of Observations in 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
      
MSA/PMSA Name: 1999 Definitions Freq. Percent 
Abilene, TX MSA 6,218 0.06 
Akron, OH PMSA 33,553 0.34 
Albany, GA MSA 5,584 0.06 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY MSA 35,052 0.35 
Albuquerque, NM MSA 35,016 0.35 
Alexandria, LA MSA 5,690 0.06 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA MSA 29,018 0.29 
Altoona, PA MSA 6,425 0.06 
Amarillo, TX MSA 11,680 0.12 
Anchorage, AK MSA 8,136 0.08 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 22,103 0.22 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA 16,515 0.17 
Asheville, NC MSA 11,213 0.11 
Atlanta, GA MSA 153,041 1.54 
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 19,281 0.19 
Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 7,100 0.07 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 20,940 0.21 
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 67,508 0.68 
Bakersfield, CA MSA 32,207 0.33 
Baltimore, MD PMSA 129,122 1.3 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA 7,792 0.08 
Baton Rouge, LA MSA 23,611 0.24 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX MSA 17,220 0.17 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 9,014 0.09 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 63,152 0.64 
Billings, MT MSA 4,981 0.05 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS MSA 11,293 0.11 
Binghamton, NY MSA 9,715 0.1 
Birmingham, AL MSA 34,257 0.35 
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 9,037 0.09 
Boise City, ID MSA 21,269 0.21 
Boston, MA-NH PMSA 169,223 1.71 
Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 11,977 0.12 
Brazoria, TX PMSA 12,379 0.12 
Bremerton, WA PMSA 11,506 0.12 
Bridgeport, CT PMSA 14,198 0.14 
Brockton, MA PMSA 12,536 0.13 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX .. 15,768 0.16 
Bryan-College Station, TX MSA 6,933 0.07 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA 47,865 0.48 
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 20,268 0.2 
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 5,585 0.06 
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 10,227 0.1 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC MSA 22,607 0.23 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA 69,950 0.71 
Charlottesville, VA MSA 8,765 0.09 
Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 22,489 0.23 
Chicago, IL PMSA 350,955 3.54 
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 10,281 0.1 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 71,393 0.72 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA 112,427 1.13 
Colorado Springs, CO MSA 27,672 0.28 
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Columbia, MO MSA 6,185 0.06 
Columbia, SC MSA 27,219 0.27 
Columbus, GA-AL MSA 9,465 0.1 
Columbus, OH MSA 74,234 0.75 
Corpus Christi, TX MSA 12,038 0.12 
Dallas, TX PMSA 174,965 1.77 
Danbury, CT PMSA 9,756 0.1 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL MSA 11,523 0.12 
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 46,293 0.47 
Daytona Beach, FL MSA 23,668 0.24 
Decatur, AL MSA 6,003 0.06 
Decatur, IL MSA 6,474 0.07 
Denver, CO PMSA 107,043 1.08 
Des Moines, IA MSA 13,434 0.14 
Detroit, MI PMSA 172,825 1.74 
Dothan, AL MSA 14,065 0.14 
Dover, DE MSA 6,278 0.06 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA 10,490 0.11 
Dutchess County, NY PMSA 13,707 0.14 
El Paso, TX MSA 30,990 0.31 
Elmira, NY MSA 7,657 0.08 
Erie, PA MSA 12,789 0.13 
Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 17,127 0.17 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY MSA 12,736 0.13 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 4,739 0.05 
Fayetteville, NC MSA 12,454 0.13 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR MSA 16,291 0.16 
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA PMSA 6,984 0.07 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 4,837 0.05 
Flint, MI PMSA 7,596 0.08 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA 12,903 0.13 
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 85,671 0.86 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA 30,983 0.31 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL MSA 20,300 0.2 
Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 7,401 0.07 
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 9,468 0.1 
Fort Wayne, IN MSA 24,711 0.25 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA 90,594 0.91 
Fresno, CA MSA 44,351 0.45 
Gadsden, AL MSA 4,449 0.04 
Gainesville, FL MSA 11,574 0.12 
Galveston-Texas City, TX PMSA 13,363 0.13 
Gary, IN PMSA 29,065 0.29 
Glens Falls, NY MSA 8,497 0.09 
Goldsboro, NC MSA 7,323 0.07 
Grand Junction, CO MSA 6,159 0.06 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA 38,998 0.39 
Greeley, CO PMSA 10,950 0.11 
Green Bay, WI MSA 8,791 0.09 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point.. 65,018 0.66 
Greenville, NC MSA 6,252 0.06 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC MSA 39,966 0.4 
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 7,842 0.08 
Hamilton-Middletown, OH PMSA 15,537 0.16 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA 27,211 0.27 
Hartford, CT MSA 36,467 0.37 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC MSA 16,194 0.16 
Honolulu, HI MSA 45,054 0.45 
Houston, TX PMSA 195,781 1.98 
Huntsville, AL MSA 16,973 0.17 
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Indianapolis, IN MSA 80,341 0.81 
Iowa City, IA MSA 4,478 0.05 
Jackson, MS MSA 18,570 0.19 
Jackson, TN MSA 5,432 0.05 
Jacksonville, FL MSA 6,047 0.06 
Jamestown, NY MSA 9,635 0.1 
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 6,366 0.06 
Jersey City, NJ PMSA 27,184 0.27 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA.. 15,337 0.15 
Johnstown, PA MSA 16,433 0.17 
Joplin, MO MSA 8,400 0.08 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA 21,626 0.22 
Kankakee, IL PMSA 5,951 0.06 
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 80,461 0.81 
Kenosha, WI PMSA 5,173 0.05 
Killeen-Temple, TX MSA 14,596 0.15 
Knoxville, TN MSA 29,715 0.3 
Kokomo, IN MSA 5,246 0.05 
La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 4,471 0.05 
Lafayette, IN MSA 9,792 0.1 
Lafayette, LA MSA 6,548 0.07 
Lake Charles, LA MSA 6,083 0.06 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL MSA 10,985 0.11 
Lancaster, PA MSA 20,430 0.21 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 21,965 0.22 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 89,702 0.91 
Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA 13,487 0.14 
Lexington, KY MSA 12,683 0.13 
Lima, OH MSA 7,517 0.08 
Lincoln, NE MSA 9,367 0.09 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR MSA 25,529 0.26 
Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 7,633 0.08 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA 455,585 4.6 
Louisville, KY-IN MSA 52,695 0.53 
Lowell, MA-NH PMSA 14,791 0.15 
Lubbock, TX MSA 12,066 0.12 
Lynchburg, VA MSA 10,854 0.11 
Macon, GA MSA 15,410 0.16 
Madison, WI MSA 18,709 0.19 
Manchester, NH PMSA 4,408 0.04 
Mansfield, OH MSA 5,948 0.06 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX MSA 21,926 0.22 
Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 8,386 0.08 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL MSA 29,030 0.29 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 45,936 0.46 
Merced, CA MSA 10,269 0.1 
Miami, FL PMSA 107,728 1.09 
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 55,136 0.56 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA 50,963 0.51 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA 60,615 0.61 
Mobile, AL MSA 21,328 0.22 
Modesto, CA MSA 22,883 0.23 
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 64,834 0.65 
Monroe, LA MSA 4,787 0.05 
Montgomery, AL MSA 13,790 0.14 
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 10,851 0.11 
Naples, FL MSA 15,979 0.16 
Nashua, NH PMSA 4,601 0.05 
Nashville, TN MSA 67,128 0.68 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 139,056 1.4 
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New Bedford, MA PMSA 9,248 0.09 
New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA 17,083 0.17 
New Orleans, LA MSA 40,387 0.41 
New York, NY PMSA 365,652 3.69 
Newark, NJ PMSA 101,038 1.02 
Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 15,082 0.15 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, .. 78,656 0.79 
Oakland, CA PMSA 120,551 1.22 
Oklahoma City, OK MSA 37,360 0.38 
Olympia, WA PMSA 9,791 0.1 
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 22,447 0.23 
Orange County, CA PMSA 148,881 1.5 
Orlando, FL MSA 99,447 1 
Pensacola, FL MSA 21,018 0.21 
Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 21,516 0.22 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 190,900 1.93 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 174,489 1.76 
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 108,240 1.09 
Portland, ME MSA 8,475 0.09 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA 93,349 0.94 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA .. 50,007 0.5 
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 20,076 0.2 
Racine, WI PMSA 6,663 0.07 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA 65,762 0.66 
Reading, PA MSA 18,684 0.19 
Redding, CA MSA 8,765 0.09 
Reno, NV MSA 19,582 0.2 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA MSA 9,002 0.09 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA 56,710 0.57 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA 162,412 1.64 
Roanoke, VA MSA 12,488 0.13 
Rochester, NY MSA 54,488 0.55 
Rockford, IL MSA 16,765 0.17 
Rocky Mount, NC MSA 6,399 0.06 
Sacramento, CA PMSA 91,495 0.92 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI MSA 20,024 0.2 
Salem, OR PMSA 13,406 0.14 
Salinas, CA MSA 12,568 0.13 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 64,717 0.65 
San Antonio, TX MSA 78,587 0.79 
San Diego, CA MSA 141,642 1.43 
San Francisco, CA PMSA 88,241 0.89 
San Jose, CA PMSA 85,710 0.87 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, 11,952 0.12 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA .. 20,186 0.2 
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA PMSA 13,036 0.13 
Santa Fe, NM MSA 7,469 0.08 
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 24,061 0.24 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 38,376 0.39 
Savannah, GA MSA 12,233 0.12 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA .. 35,821 0.36 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA 103,090 1.04 
Sharon, PA MSA 7,832 0.08 
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 4,093 0.04 
Sioux Falls, SD MSA 3,943 0.04 
South Bend, IN MSA 12,900 0.13 
Spokane, WA MSA 21,895 0.22 
Springfield, MA MSA 24,655 0.25 
Springfield, MO MSA 17,233 0.17 
St. Cloud, MN MSA 4,219 0.04 
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St. Joseph, MO MSA 5,401 0.05 
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 120,255 1.21 
Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA 17,955 0.18 
State College, PA MSA 7,053 0.07 
Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 29,166 0.29 
Sumter, SC MSA 3,909 0.04 
Syracuse, NY MSA 43,968 0.44 
Tacoma, WA PMSA 37,953 0.38 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA 140,207 1.42 
Terre Haute, IN MSA 7,442 0.08 
Toledo, OH MSA 30,520 0.31 
Topeka, KS MSA 7,053 0.07 
Trenton, NJ PMSA 16,547 0.17 
Tucson, AZ MSA 46,574 0.47 
Tulsa, OK MSA 29,935 0.3 
Tyler, TX MSA 8,871 0.09 
Utica-Rome, NY MSA 15,562 0.16 
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 25,426 0.26 
Ventura, CA PMSA 38,714 0.39 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ PMSA 8,121 0.08 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA MSA 19,938 0.2 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA 184,614 1.86 
Waterbury, CT PMSA 4,626 0.05 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 5,077 0.05 
Wausau, WI MSA 8,109 0.08 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA 72,964 0.74 
Wichita Falls, TX MSA 6,302 0.06 
Wichita, KS MSA 23,543 0.24 
Wilmington, NC MSA 13,913 0.14 
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD PMSA 22,777 0.23 
Worcester, MA-CT PMSA 13,898 0.14 
Yolo, CA PMSA 9,141 0.09 
York, PA MSA 16,469 0.17 
Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA 28,621 0.29 
Yuba City, CA MSA 7,586 0.08 
Yuma, AZ MSA 6,174 0.06 
      
Total 9,907,514 100 
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics of WLRD Portion of Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
          
Wharton Index 0.215 0.942 -2.024 4.796 
Approval Delay Index 6.651 4.142 -0.578 29.389 
Supply Restrictions Index 0.256 0.949 0 6 
Local Political Pressure Index 0.191 0.976 -1.851 7.494 
State Political Involvement Index 0.127 0.989 -2.158 2.416 
State Court Involvement Index 2.175 0.643 1 3 
Local Zoning Approval Index 1.975 0.820 0 6 
Local Project Approval Index 1.591 1.009 0 6 
Local Assembly Index 0.020 0.139 0 1 
Density Restrictions Index 0.217 0.412 0 1 
          
Open Space Index 0.633 0.482 0 1 
Exactions Index 0.784 0.412 0 1 
          
Total Observations 9,907,514       
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  Appendix 4: Summary Statistics by WRLURI Quartile 
  1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
LPP Sub-Index -0.361 0.650 -0.037 0.613 0.176 0.798 0.970 1.179 
SR Sub-Index 0.047 0.286 0.079 0.416 0.234 0.674 0.654 1.620 
ADI Sub-Index 3.321 1.774 5.121 2.585 7.185 2.880 10.871 4.327 
owns dwelling 0.750 0.433 0.737 0.440 0.730 0.444 0.731 0.444 
rents dwelling 0.250 0.433 0.263 0.440 0.270 0.444 0.269 0.444 
Wharton Index -0.909 0.331 -0.133 0.156 0.410 0.180 1.459 0.636 
lives in single-fam 0.818 0.386 0.798 0.402 0.794 0.404 0.766 0.424 
lives in apartment 0.150 0.357 0.169 0.375 0.177 0.382 0.193 0.395 
lives in duplex 0.032 0.175 0.033 0.180 0.029 0.167 0.041 0.198 
property taxes ~1000 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.008 
property taxes ~2000 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.004 
property taxes ~3000 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 
property taxes ~4000 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005 
property taxes ~5000 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 rent (in dollar value)   $              147   $              308   $              183   $              367   $              199   $              388   $              214   $              419  
log rent 1.029 3.002 1.164 3.128 1.237 3.187 1.249 3.214 
log condo fee -0.508 1.023 -0.417 1.247 -0.375 1.334 -0.277 1.524 
 household income  
(in dollar value)   $        61,939   $        59,077   $        66,665   $        64,370   $        69,204   $        66,123   $        74,251   $        70,921  
log household income 10.684 0.918 10.752 0.922 10.789 0.924 10.855 0.933 
 dwelling value  
(in dollar value)   $  2,114,943   $  3,359,696  $  2,238,283  $  3,359,704  $  2,324,116  $  3,382,565  $  2,373,440  $  3,391,322  
log dwelling value 12.822 1.890 13.059 1.823 13.200 1.766 13.353 1.668 
linguistically iso~d 0.037 0.188 0.050 0.217 0.060 0.238 0.058 0.234 
no bedrooms 0.007 0.084 0.009 0.096 0.011 0.105 0.010 0.102 
1 bedroom 0.068 0.251 0.072 0.258 0.075 0.264 0.081 0.273 
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2 bedrooms 0.201 0.401 0.205 0.404 0.207 0.405 0.216 0.411 
3 bedrooms 0.453 0.498 0.426 0.494 0.406 0.491 0.395 0.489 
4 bedrooms 0.218 0.413 0.226 0.418 0.231 0.421 0.229 0.420 
5 or more bedrooms 0.053 0.225 0.063 0.242 0.070 0.254 0.069 0.254 
married 0.581 0.493 0.577 0.494 0.574 0.494 0.572 0.495 
not married 0.419 0.493 0.423 0.494 0.426 0.494 0.428 0.495 
white race 0.732 0.443 0.679 0.467 0.649 0.477 0.669 0.470 
black race 0.121 0.327 0.104 0.305 0.098 0.297 0.090 0.286 
Asian race 0.037 0.188 0.056 0.231 0.068 0.252 0.081 0.273 
other race 0.015 0.122 0.016 0.126 0.017 0.130 0.020 0.140 
Hispanic ethnicity 0.095 0.293 0.145 0.352 0.168 0.374 0.140 0.347 
< high school 0.109 0.311 0.109 0.311 0.111 0.314 0.099 0.299 
some college 0.230 0.421 0.231 0.421 0.232 0.422 0.225 0.417 
college educated 0.289 0.453 0.311 0.463 0.317 0.465 0.345 0.475 
employed 0.626 0.484 0.627 0.484 0.627 0.484 0.630 0.483 
not employed 0.046 0.210 0.048 0.215 0.052 0.221 0.046 0.210 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Observations  
          
2,449,057    
          
2,449,873                 
          
2,503,737                 
          
2,504,847                 
Total Observations 
           
9,907,514    
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